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Frictions and Tax-Motivated Hedging:
An Empirical Exploration of PubliclyTraded Exchangeable Securities
Abstract - As financial engineering becomes more sophisticated ,
taxing income from capital becomes increasingly difficult . We offer
the first empirical study of a high profile strategy known as " taxfree hedging ," which offers economic benefits of a sale without triggering tax. We explore nontax costs that taxpayers face when hedg-

ing by issuing so-called "DECS," "PHONES," and other publicly-traded exchangeable securities. Focusing on 61 transactions
between 1993 and 2001, we shed light on why taxpayers might
prefer to hedge through private "over-the-counter" transactions:
An offering of exchangeable securities is announced in advance and
implemented all at once, triggering an almost 4 percent decline in
the underlying stock price before the hedge is implemented.

INTRODUCTION

As ing financial
ing income
income
from
engineering
capital becomes
from increasingly
capital becomes
difficult
becomes more increasingly sophisticated, difficult tax(see, e.g., Bradford, 1995; and Warren, 1993). A crucial issue
for tax policymakers, then, is the ease - or difficulty - of
implementing tax-advantaged transactions (see, e.g., Schizer,
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2001). Yet given the inherent secrecy of sophisticated tax planning, the necessary data are usually unavailable. In an effort
to shed light on high-end tax planning, we offer the first empirical study of a high profile strategy known as "tax-free
hedging," which offers economic benefits of a sale without
triggering tax.1 We explore one method of hedging, in which
the taxpayer issues publicly-traded exchangeable securities,
known by acronyms such as DECS and PHONES (hereinafter "exchangeable securities").2 We focus on such offerings
between 1993 and 2001, identifying 61 transactions that account for $24 billion in proceeds. Using these publicly-available data, we offer empirical evidence about various nontax
costs or so-called "frictions" that discourage taxpayers from
hedging with exchangeable securities. In so doing, we show
why these transactions can prove costly. Relatedly, we explain why taxpayers often prefer to hedge through a different method - private "over-the-counter" transactions with
1 See, e.g., Paul, 1996; Schenk, 1995; and Weisbach, 1997.
2 See Schizer, 2001.
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esis that issuers do not
offer discounts (or,
now,
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discounts that are corrected in the
throughat least,
anecdotal
ev
short term).
Some
frictions,
inclu
vestment bank, also burden over-theIn general, our findings suggest that
counter transactions (and, for that matter, public exchangeable securities pose less
taxable block sales). Yet at least two fric- of a threat to the tax base than private
tions burden exchangeable securities but over-the-counter transactions. Likewise,
not over-the-counter deals. First, with a given the costliness of public transactions,
public offering, the taxpayer must an- taxpayers will not always turn to them if
nounce the hedge to the market in adprivate transactions become more diffivance, thereby precipitating a decline in cult, for instance, due to a targeted tax rethe underlying stock price before the hedge
form aimed only at private transactions.
is implemented. Likewise, a public offer- Yet some substitutions are likely. As (liming typically is implemented all at once, ited) support for the prediction that some
and thus causes price pressure on the un- substitutions will occur, we find that when
derlying stock. Over-the-counter deals
a publicly-traded taxpayer announces an
generally can avoid these costs because
exchangeable securities offering, the
they are not announced in advance and taxpayer's stock price generally rises. The
are executed in stages. Thus, we find that implication is that in the deals in our
the announcement of an exchangeable sample - and presumably in at least some
offering is associated with a -1.62 percent other deals as well - the market believes
average abnormal return in the underly- that the tax savings or other benefits outing stock, measured on the announcement weigh the costs.
date and the following two trading days;
The paper proceeds as follows. After
however, this effect is imprecisely esti- considering instances in which taxpayers
mated. Later, when the hedging security can acquire a large appreciated block of
actually is issued, there is a -3.33 percent stock, we outline various ways of disposaverage abnormal return in the underly- ing of this stock, of which some trigger an
ing stock (i.e., over the two days before immediate tax and some do not. Next, we
the security is issued) that is statistically focus on exchangeable securities, describdifferent from zero at the 95 percent con- ing our data sample and offering sumfidence level.
mary statistics. In the third section, we
Second, the complexity and relative il- analyze and quantify important frictions
liquidity of exchangeable securities may that burden exchangeable securities,
force the taxpayer to issue them at a dis- while also mentioning frictions that burcount, a cost that should not burden over- den the other disposition methods outthe-counter transactions because securilined in the first section. Finally, we ex-

ties dealers have a high tolerance for com-amine announcement effects on the issuplexity and illiquidity. If generous pricingers' stock and contrast these effects with

must be offered, arbitrageurs can be ex-the announcement effects on other methpected to capitalize on it and, ultimately,ods of raising capital, especially those reto trade it away. On the other hand, dis-lated to disposing of assets.
counted pricing may in fact be unneces-

sary. Anecdotal evidence suggests thatALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION

certain clienteles, including hedge funds,STRATEGIES
actually prefer exchangeable securities to
the underlying stock. While our evidence We begin by explaining the scenario
on this question is not clear cut, our find-that prompts taxpayers to issue exchange168
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will also wantAfter
to diversify, a motivation
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survey
that (agency costs aside) should
be less
ways that taxpayers
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ciated blocks
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taxpayers sincethis
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the firm's shareholders can
diversify on
alternative
dispositio
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Taxable Sale

on

which
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In these situations, the most straightfor-

ward response is simply to sell the posi-

Origin of Appreciated Stock Positions

tion. If only a small percentage of the over-

Taxpayers acquire large blocks of stock
in a number of ways. An individual might

all float is involved, the taxpayer might sim-

do so as a founder or senior executive of a

firm, or as a successful passive investor.
Firms also acquire stock in unrelated firms.
In a tax-free reorganization, for instance,

the taxpayer might sell a division to an

ply place a sell order with a broker, just as
a retail investor would do. If the position
is large, portions of the position can be sold
in this manner over time, a strategy we call

a "serial sale." To sell a large position all at
once, the taxpayer can hire an investment

acquirer in return for acquirer stock. Or the

bank to execute a block sale.

taxpayer might sell or spin off the major-

These various sales implicate different
disclosure requirements and costs, as discussed below. Yet they share one important cost: They are all taxable. Thus, indi-

ity of a subsidiary, while retaining a "stub."

Alternatively, the taxpayer might purchase

a stake in a start-up through a venture
capital investment or joint venture.3

viduals pay tax at the applicable com-

These large stock positions often are
highly appreciated. The firm may have

bined federal and state capital gains tax

paid very little to acquire the stock (e.g., in

a start-up investment). Or the firm may
have acquired the stock in a reorganization,

such that the stock basis derives from a real

asset that was subject to tax depreciation.

These acquisitions may have occurred
years earlier and, during the bull market
of the 1990s, stock appreciation was rapid,
especially for high-technology firms.
However the taxpayer acquired the appreciated stock, the degree of taxpayer
control over the portfolio investment will
vary, as will the size of the taxpayer's

rate. By selling, individuals also forfeit the

opportunity to attain a step-up in basis

at death that would eliminate the income

tax on the unrealized capital gain. While
the latter factor obviously is not a concern
to corporate taxpayers, they typically face

higher tax rates on capital gains (generally a federal tax rate of 35 percent) than

individuals face. This tax is due even if

the firm is not otherwise profitable, since
ordinary losses (i.e., from operations of the
firm's business) cannot offset capital gain.

Only a firm with otherwise unused capital losses is indifferent to this tax liability.

stake. Yet all the scenarios are similar in

an important way: At some point, the tax- Tax-Deferred Alternatives
payer will want to sell. The taxpayer may
believe the portfolio investment has Some investors, then, will have business

peaked in value, or may need cash for a reasons to sell appreciated stock, but tax
more promising opportunity. Individuals reasons not to do so. These investors

3 In our sample, it is rare for the investor to acquire a stake in the underlying stock by simply buying shares i
the public market. For a list of the transactions in our sample with some details on how the taxpayer acquired
the block of stock, see the working paper version of this paper (Gentry and Schizer, 2002).
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some exposure
to the hedged asset's refavor
strategies
turnsale,
- in other words,
to use a partial as
efits
of
a
such
hedge.
For example, if an
asset is worth
insulation
from
risk,
w
$100, the taxpayer gains
can accept risk of ta
current
capital
loss from $100 to $95 (by buying a put at
free"
reorganization
o
$95), while retaining
for gain
and
a
change
inopportunity
the
tax
$100 to $115 (by selling
a call at $115);
(albeit
nofrom
cash,
assumi
such a combination of that
a put and a call is th
but
we
assume
as a collar.taxpayer
Practitioners generally
owned
byknown
the
believe that such a transaction does not
such
a
reorganization.
might

Tax

trigger a current tax
(see generally
advisors
have

d

Schizer,
1998).
"hedging"
transaction
payer
retains
title
an
Issuance of Exchangeable Securities
appreciated
asset,
whi
core feature of a tax-deferred
hedge
economic The
return
thro
tractual
arrangement.
is that the taxpayer transfers most, but not
the box" are an old version of this stratall, of the appreciated asset's economic
egy, while derivative securities such asreturn to a hedging counterparty. One
swaps and collars offer more modern
source of hedging counterparties is the
variations. Until 1997, taxpayers could
public market. Thus, in the transactions
transfer all the economic exposure of athat we study, the taxpayer issues an expublicly-traded stock, receive sale pro-changeable security to public investors
(or, in some cases, to institutional invesceeds, and not trigger current capital gains
tax. Tax would be deferred until the taxtors in a private placement). To serve as a
close substitute for a sale, this exchangepayer physically delivered the property
to settle the hedge.
able security has a feature that distin-

After a widely publicized short saleguishes it from "classic" exchangeable
against the box, Congress responded indebt that has been studied by others: The
1997 with the constructive sale rule of
holder, rather than the issuer, bears risk
Internal Revenue Code Section 1259.

of loss in the underlying security.4
Technical details aside, this rule imposes
For example, assume that a firm ("Cora current tax if the hedge is too perfect,
poration") owns one million shares of
but allows taxpayers to defer theirstock
tax as
of the Portfolio Corporation (the
long as the hedge is sufficiently imper"Stock"), a 5 percent interest in Portfolio
fect. The key question is whether
the
Corporation
(with the rest held by public
hedge transfers "substantially all" shareholders).
of the
Corporation's cost basis

risk of loss and opportunity for
gain
is $20
per share, and the Stock price is now

in the appreciated asset. Thus, the$100.
typiOn January 1, 2002, Corporation
cal way to avoid section 1259 is to issues
retainone million securities ("Debt
4 One type of security in our sample, PHONES, resembles classic exchangeable debt in that it offers investors
principal protection. But the very long term of PHONES - 30 years, compared with the five or ten year term
that is typical of classic exchangeable debt - renders this principal protection economically insignificant. In
substance, then, PHONES do expose the holder to risk of loss in the underlying security. For a discussion of
PHONES, see the subsection below entitled "Tax Uncertainty."
Studies of classic exchangeable debt (see Barber, 1993 and Ghosh et al., 1990) have concluded that its use is
not tax motivated. This is not surprising since, in leaving the issuer with full risk of loss on the underlying
stock, these deals are not close substitutes for a taxable sale. Furthermore, these old exchangeable securities
were developed during a bear market in which fewer firms had appreciated stock.
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appreciation. DECS
yield more than
$100
Exchangeable
for
Comm

or "DECS") to investors ("Holders")

at maturity only if the Stock appreciates
above $120. At that point, Holders enjoy
tion transfers most of the economic re83 percent of increases. For instance, if
turn in the Stock to Holders, while retain- the stock price rises to $220, the Holder
ing some opportunity for gain in order will receive $183. Since Corporation reto avoid a constructive sale. To compen- tains all appreciation from $100 to $120,
sate Holders for receiving less than all and 17 percent of the rest, tax lawyers
the opportunity for gain, Corporation generally believe that issuance of a DECS
makes a periodic payment exceeding with these terms does not trigger capital
the dividend on the Stock. Specifically, gains tax.
In the above example, the taxpayer is a
assuming the Stock pays no dividends,
Holders receive annual interest payments corporation. It is more difficult (and thus
of 6 percent during the five-year term of less common) for individuals to use the
the DECS. At maturity, Holders receive public markets for hedging, since, unlike
a number of shares of Stock (the "Ex- corporations, individuals are not able to

for $100.5 Through the DECS, Corpora-

change Ratio") that depends on the issue

securities under their own names.

trading price of the Stock at maturity. Instead, individuals form a trust to serve
The Exchange Ratio is determined as fol- as an intermediary that issues the securities. The individual then enters into a

lows:

hedging contract with the trust (with

Stock

terms that resemble the DECS described

Cash

Price at Exchange Equivalent

Maturity Ratio Amount

Less than $100 1.0 share Value of one
share of Stock

From and 1.0 share $100

including $100 to .833
to and shares

including $120

Above $120 .833 shares $100 plus 83

above).6 The trust, in turn, issues a similar security to the public. This structure
imposes fixed costs that do not arise for
corporations, since a trust must be established and maintained; in contrast, corporate issuers already are equipped to issue
public securities.
Over-the-Counter Alternative

percent of the

excess of the
value of one

share of Stock

Instead of hedging through the public
markets, taxpayers can enter into private
transactions with securities dealers in-

over $120.

volving equity swaps, prepaid forward

contracts, or collars. As long as these

The effect is to transfer to Holders the

full risk of loss in the Stock. If the Stock

hedges are structured to leave the taxpayer with sufficient exposure to the un-

is worth $15, then Holders will receive

$15 (whether in stock or cash). On the
other hand, as the Stock price rises from
$100 to $120, Holders do not share in that

derlying stock, they do not trigger a con-

structive sale. Frictions arise in these trans-

actions as well, but this study does not

5 "DECS" is a service mark of Salomon Brothers. Other investment banks market similar products but use other

acronyms, such as STRYPES, ACES, SAILS, MEDS, PEPS, and PERCS.
6 One difference is that the individual generally compensates the trust for time value - not with a periodic
payment - but by accepting a discount on the proceeds received. For instance, if the current price of the
underlying stock is $100, the trust is likely to pay only, say, $82. Meanwhile, the trust will still raise $100 from

public investors, and will use the remaining $18 to buy Treasury strips that fund a periodic payment to investors.
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the basis of the issuers
is complicated
them
because
by the various ways in which the invesAnecdotal evidence suggests that these tors acquire their position, as discussed
transactions are common, and that the above.
address

available.7

Examples of typical transactions in our
volume is considerably larger than the
volume of public deals for which data are sample illustrate the difficulties in estab-

available. For instance, Liberty Media lishing the unrealized capital gain. For
Corporation's April 2002 Annual Report example, Kerr-McGee acquired its stock
offers a rare glimpse of a firm's over-the- in Devon Energy in 1996 in exchange for
counter hedging. In addition to issuing its North American onshore oil and gas
exchangeable securities to hedge $3.2 bil- fields, presumably in a tax-free reorganilion of stock (in transactions that are in zation; in 1999, Kerr-McGee issued DECS
our sample), Liberty reports that it also based on its shares in Devon Energy.
hedged an additional $9.2 billion of stock Kerr-McGee's tax basis in these shares
through over-the-counter deals. Unfortu- would be its carry-over basis from its oil
nately, this detailed report is atypical.
properties, a number that is not disclosed
Notwithstanding data limitations, our but is likely to be quite low (e.g., due to
analysis below sheds light on the ques- tax depreciation). For the trust-based
tion of why taxpayers might prefer over- deals, the Snyder STRYPES Trust is repthe-counter deals to exchangeable secu- resentative. Daniel Snyder and various
rities. One factor is that the private nature family members backed the trust whose
of the over-the-counter transactions is itsecurities were based on shares of Snyder
self valuable, helping the taxpayer "sell" Communications, of which Daniel Snyder
the appreciated stock at a higher price. A was founder and chief executive officer;
second factor is that public investors as founder of a highly successful commight demand a premium for holding
pany, he likely had a low basis in his
complex and illiquid hedging securities, shares.
while securities dealers do not.
While we could not find systematic data
on tax basis, we found several examples

The Economic Value of Tax Deferral

that confirm the claim that the issuer had

While the financial press and even
firm's annual reports claim that the ex-

changeable securities provide a taxefficient form of financial management,
one would like a systematic calculation of
the potential tax savings from hedging
rather than selling a position.8 Estimating

a large capital gain. For example, the Tribune Company's 1991 investment of five
million dollars in America Online was a

tremendous success, representing over

half of the shares on which Tribune's is-

suance of $1.1 billion of PHONES in 1999
was based; thus, almost the entire value

7 For instance, an "affiliate/' including an officer, director, or shareholder that owns more than 10 percent of the

firm, may have to hold the stock for more than a year before hedging (e.g., if the stock was acquired in a
private placement) and the securities dealer that executes the transaction may have to comply with the volume and manner of sale limitations of Rule 144 (i.e., on short sales with which the dealer hedges its own
exposure on the derivative). There are also securities law constraints on nonaffiliates who hedge stock received in a private placement, but these constraints are modest. Small investors generally cannot use the
over-the-counter derivatives market because of the commodities laws. For a discussion of these and other
frictions, see Schizer (2001) and Schizer (2000c).

8 Liberty Media's 2002 Annual Report extols the benefits of both public and over-the-counter transactions
(page 6): "We were particularly active in the financial management arena in 2001. As we were anticipating a
potential decline in public company stock prices, we took aggressive steps during the year to protect some of
our public stock holdings. We used financial instruments to limit our downside risk in these holdings and to
extract liquidity from non-strategic investments in a tax-efficient manner."
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rather than
selling thea
position.
As a
position
was
capital

parison,

simplistic benchmark for the
potential
Tribune's
DECS

g

b

tax savings at stake in these
transactions, are
Learning Company
stock
Table 1 providesmore
the present value
of
investment with
pedest
the tax savings from tax deferral under
mance. In 1993, Tribune acquired
Compton's from Encyclopedia Britannica some simple assumptions. The corporate
for $57 million in cash; in 1995, it acquired tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent.
shares in the Learning Company in ex- Various assumptions are made about
change for its equity in Compton's. In the duration of the deferral (three, five,
1998, Tribune raised $128.5 million in a ten, and thirty years), the tax basis (0,
DECS offering based on its position in the 25 and 50 percent of the total value),
Learning Company. Using the $57 million and discount rate (5 and 10 percent).

as a rough estimate of Tribune's basis in Each cell offers the tax savings' present
the Learning Company (various intracom- value as a percentage of the position's
pany transactions between 1993 and 1998 value. The length of maturity is the most
could have affected this basis), the basis important determinant of the tax
was only 44 percent of the total value of
the asset. In general, the other examples
that we found suggest appreciation between these two examples, such that tax
deferral is likely to be a key feature of

these transactions.

deferral's value. For the shorter duration

instruments, the value of the tax savings
is generally less than 10 percent of the
value of the security; however, for a 30year instrument, the value of tax deferral
may be over 20 percent of the value of the

The size of the gain is only one of the asset.
inputs necessary for calculating the value These calculations belie many technical
of tax deferral. In addition, the applicabledetails that complicate the analysis of tax
tax rate at the issue date (when the stockbenefits. For example, issuers have the
would have been sold) and when the se- option of settling in cash and possibly concurity is settled (if it is settled with stock) tinuing to defer tax by issuing another
will affect the tax savings. A firm's taxsecurity or holding the position
rate on capital gains is also difficult to unhedged. In addition, the issuer makes
estimate because it depends on the level periodic payments and also retains some
of the firm's capital losess and net operat- exposure to risk, each of which affects the
ing losses. The term of the security, issuer's overall tax liability. Periodic paythe firm's discount rate and various asments - through which the issuer purchases the ability to share in further gains
pects of the security affect the amount
on
of tax savings generated by hedging

the stock - reduce the issuer's tax li-

TABLE 1

ILLUSTRATION OF THE VALUE OF TAX DEFERRAL AS A PERCENTAGE

Tax Basis as a percent 0 25 50 0 25 50

of current value

Discount
Length

of

rate

5%

5%

5%

10%

10%

10%

deferral

3 years 4.76 3.57 2.38 8.70 6.53 4.35
5 years 7.58 5.68 3.79 13.27 9.51 6.63
10 years 13.51 10.13 6.76 21.51 16.13 10.75

30

years

Source:
Auth
exchangeable
that
the
secu
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ability.9
On
other
rity,
the issuerthe
does not keep any
opporsuer
retains
tunity for gain onsome
95 percent of the hedged opp
subsequent
share
pric
shares; instead,
the issuer nominally keeps
increase
the
issuer's
ta
the full risk of loss
- the reason why a concomplications
structive sale arguablyhighligh
is not triggered.11
culations Yet
of
saving
this claimtax
is aggressive because
the
if
complete
data
were
security does not
mature for 30 years,
and
less,
the
calculations
so the present value of this risk of loss is
in
general
magnitude
of
t
insignificant. While there is uncertainty
about whether thissecuritie
transaction "works,"
exchangeable
a position.
conservative taxpayers remain free to use
the safer "DECS" structure.

Tax Uncertainty

Finally, there has been uncertainty

Of course, taxpayers themselves will
know how much they stand to gain from
deferring the tax unless there is uncertainty about whether the tax actually can

about a separate tax question. Typically,
taxpayers combine their hedging transaction with a financing, in that they receive

cash (the equivalent of sale proceeds) at

be deferred - that is, about whether hedging transactions actually avoid triggering

the same time that they transfer the eco-

capital gains tax. Such uncertainty would

nomic return in the hedged asset. In return for this cash, taxpayers must com-

deter marginal transactions. Yet the tax bar

pensate their hedging counterparty

generally is very confident about hedg-

(whether it is a public investor or an in-

ing transactions in which the taxpayer retains the first 20 percent of appreciation

vestment bank) with a payment that is the

economic equivalent of interest. It is not
clear whether this interest expense is detransaction or the typical over-theductible. In part, the question turns on
counter transaction. It is doubtful that
whether the hedge is structured to qualify
many of these transactions have been deas debt for tax purposes. While there is
terred by tax uncertainty.
some uncertainty on the issue, DECS and
A more aggressive variation of public
PHONES generally are thought to satisfy
this condition, but trust structures do
securities has been the subject of uncernot.12 Furthermore, under the tax straddle
tainty, though. With a "PHONES" secu-

in the underlying property, like a DECS

9 Either they are deductible or they must be capitalized into the basis of the stock, depending on application of
the straddle rules. See the subsection below entitled "Tax Uncertainty."
10 As a simple example, return to our numerical example of a DECS contract discussed above. The issuer has a
capital gain of $80 per share for each of one million shares. Assuming that the share price at expiration is $90
and the issuer elects to settle the contract with stock, the issuer will recognize a capital gain of $80 per share
($80 million in total) at maturity because it received $100 million for the stock for which it paid $20 million,
despite the fact that if it had not hedged and had sold the stock at the maturity, the gain would have only been
$70 million. Alternatively, assume the stock price appreciates to $150 per share at maturity. The issuer can
settle the contract by delivering 833,333 shares to the holders. Its tax basis in these shares would be $16.67
million. The gain associated with these shares would be the $100 million received at the issuance of the DECS
less this tax basis, a gain of $83.33 million. In addition, the issuer still holds 166,667 shares with a tax basis of

$20 per share. The unrealized capital gain on these shares is $21.67 million. Note that any increase in the
issuer's tax liability is offset, from the government's perspective, by a reduction in the holder's tax liability.
For instance, if the stock price declines - such that the hedge preserved the issuer's profit (and thus inflated
the issuer's tax liability) - the holder will have a corresponding capital loss.
11 PHONES is a service mark of Merrill Lynch. Other similar products include PRIZES and ZONES.

12 PHONES are thought to be debt securities because they guarantee holders the return of their investment.
DECS are analyzed as a combination of a debt security and a forward contract. Trust structures, in contrast,
are thought to be prepaid forward contracts. For a discussion, see Schizer (2000a).
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nates a must
considerable amount
of the be too
the debt
not
lated to the issuer's
hedge.13
risk of holding the
Until
underlying re
throughout most
security In order
of
to obtain
the
the necessary
period
we have data),
data for
many
empirical work,
tax
the sample
adviso
ends
in December
2001.
that this test
could
be satisfie
To construct was
our sample, we
start withpurc
the hedged asset
not

rules,

a list of transactions
from the Global
Isfrom
the
debt,

proceeds

an

sues database of the Securities
Data Corpledged to secure
the
debt (se
2000b). Someporation
tax
(SDC)advisors
in which the security is were
servative on this
exchangeable issue.
into the commonSince
stock of a
20
company other than the issuer. general
From this
a proposed regulation
allowed the interest deduction in all DECS
list, we search Lexis/Nexis and Dow Jones
and PHONES, requiring this expense to News Retrieval for news accounts describbe capitalized into the basis of the hedgeding the transactions and EdgarPlus for

stock.14

prospectuses, eliminating transactions

that do not meet the criteria listed above.

Our search through the news media also

SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY

locates several transactions not identified

STATISTICS

through SDC.
Overall, the sample includes 61 transWe create a sample of transactions havactions with gross proceeds of $24.4 biling four characteristics. First, the issuer
issues an exchangeable security with
lion.
a Table 2 provides the breakdown of
payoff that depends on the stock of our
an- sample over time, indicating whether
the issuer is a publicly-traded corporation
other company. Second, the underlying
or a private trust. The first transaction is
stock is publicly traded. Third, the issuer
from 1993. Volume of transactions grew
continues to own the underlying stock.
through 1999 but fell in the last two years
This requirement eliminates transactions
in which investment banks issue exof the sample. Of the 61 transactions, pubcorporations issued 37 of the securities
changeable securities - not to hedge lic
- but
to meet the needs of specific investor
and
clitrusts issued the remaining 24, typienteles. Fourth, the new security elimically on behalf of high-net-worth indiTABLE 2

SECURITY ISSUANCE AND PROCEEDS BY YEAR
All

Issues

Public

Issuers

Year Number Gross Proceeds Number Gross Proceeds Number Gross Proceeds
1993
1
0.77
1
0.77
1994
3
1.11
3
1.11
1995
10
1.92
8
1.30
2
1996
5
0.83
1
0.05
4
1997
9
2.92
4
1.52
5
1998
8
2.86
2
1.64
6
1999
16
8.96
11
7.93
5
2000
7
3.50
5
2.29
2
2001
2
1.37
2
1.37

0
0
0
0
0.61
0.78
1.41
1.22
1.03
1.21
0
0

TOTAL

Gross
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viduals.15 Thirteen of the transactions are

pared to the overall value of the issuer's
PHONES-type securities, and the others equity.17 The average proceeds of the
are DECS. For PHONES, interest rates
hedging transaction represent 7.11 percent
range from 1.00 percent to 3.75 percent, of the overall float of the underlying stock,
while six of the eleven transactions have
suggesting that these transactions repreinterest rates of 2.00 percent.16 For DECS, sent substantial blocks of stock in the uncoupon rates are higher. All but three havederlying firms.
coupon rates of at least 5.00 percent, and To analyze costs associated with exchangeable securities, we need data on
the highest is 10.00 percent.
Table 3 provides basic summary statis-various aspects of these securities, includtics on the transactions. The mean gross ing the announcement date. We also need
proceeds are $397 million, ranging from security returns data on the issuer's stock,
$12.5 million to $1.51 billion. The securi- the underlying stock, and the new secu-

ties issued by public firms tend to yield rity. The SDC database includes informahigher gross proceeds. For the public is- tion on the exchangeable security's size,
suers, on average, the value of the ex- maturity, coupon rates, and underwriting
changeable securities is 9.06 percent of thecosts. If this information is not available
value of the issuer's equity (measured on from SDC, we use press releases and prothe date when the security is issued); how-spectuses. We calculate the market value
ever, in the median transaction, the valueof the issuer's equity and the underlying
of the exchangeable securities is only 2.64stock using the University of Chicago's
percent of the value of the issuer's equity,Center for Research on Security Prices
which suggests that the portfolio positions(CRSP) database. We also use the CRSP
being hedged are relatively modest com- data on stock returns and trading volume
TABLE 3

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable /Sample Number Median Mean Minimum Maximum
Offering Amount
All Issuers 61 $224 m $397 m $12.5 m $1,510 m

Public Issuers 37 $341 m $486 m $12.5 m $1,510 m
Private Issuers 24 $207 m $260 m $73.2 m $1,000 m
Size Relative to the Issuer's Equity Value
Public

Size
All

Issuers

37

Relative

Issuers

Public

to

60

Issuers

Private

36

Issuers

Issuers

Public

53

9.06%

Value

7.11%

4.14%

24

Issuers

Private

the

4.24%

Underwriting
All

2.64%

Underlying
43.75%
43.75%

0.83%

25.09%

2.80%

3.0%

103.9%

0.31%

5.79%

Relative

3.0%

30

of

0.31%

7.95%

4.24%

Fee,

0.29%

to

Proceeds

2.0%

2.72%

Stock

2.0%

3.5%
3.5%

Issuers

Source:

Aut
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serial sales are not easily obtained. Secfor the publicly-traded
issuer
ond, the tax basis and tax rates of indiderlying stocks.
We collect
database or
nouncement dates, we use the earliest
mention in the financial press of the exchangeable securities offering (i.e., even
if specific terms have not yet been released). If we cannot find information in
the financial press or press releases before
the filing date for the security, we assign
the filing date as the announcement date.
An issue about this methodology is that,
even if the financial press does not report
the announcement, news of the offering
may still leak out before the filing date.
To correct for this issue, we check our re-

vidual
taxpayers are not
publicly availfiling
dates

from

able,
and firms typically
do not report this
from
prospectus
information either. As we discussed

above, we expect that the issuers typically

have large unrealized capital gains.
POTENTIAL FRICTIONS
The first section of this article outlines

four alternatives for taxpayers who want
to dispose of a large block of appreciated
stock: a block sale; a serial sale; an ex-

changeable security; and an over-the-

counter derivative. The second section

describes the data we have collected about

sults, as discussed below, by running ad- the exchangeable security alternative. This
ditional regressions without the transac- section identifies and measures key frictions that have no separate announcement tions that burden exchangeable securities,

date.

and compares them with existing evi-

We also collect data on the price for the

new security when it starts trading. We
collect these prices from the NYSE's Trad-

ing and Quotation (TAQ) database, the
Bloomberg database, or the security price

dence on frictions associated with the

three alternatives. In particular, this section reports our empirical findings about
four frictions, and mentions three other
frictions that are not explored empirically

listings in the Wall Street Journal , depend-

in this article.

ing on data availability. For the statistical
work that uses the prices of the new secu-

Fees

rities, we use only securities for which
trading begins within two trading days of
the filing date for the security. Lastly, we
collect short interest data on the underly-

ing stocks from the Bloomberg database
and data from the NASDAQ.
Theoretically, in order to offer a comprehensive account of the frictions associated with exchangeable securities, we

would also need, first, complete data

Taxpayers must pay underwriting fees
to investment banks and legal fees to law
firms in issuing exchangeable securities.
In trust deals, moreover, they must pay
legal fees to create the trust and annual

fees to trustees in order to maintain these

trusts. Yet comparable costs also arise
when taxpayers engage in over-the-

counter derivative transactions, and also

about the frictions associated with alter-

in block sales. The only cheap transaction,
natives and, second, comprehensive data in this regard, is the serial sale.
The last panel of Table 3 compares unabout the tax benefit from hedging. Thus,

two limitations in our data should be re-

derwriting fees with gross proceeds. With

iterated. First, data obviously are not a few exceptions, the standard fee is 3 per-

available on the closest substitute for ex-

cent of proceeds. The exceptions are concentrated in the sample of public issuers,
derivatives transactions - because, by presumably because these deals are larger
their very nature, these transactions are on average, and also because public firms
private. Similarly, data on block sales and (unlike special-purpose trusts) have con-

changeable securities-over-the-counter
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they report mean fees of 5.0 percent of
relationships
gross proceeds. On the other hand, the fee
of direct transaction costs does not include
would be much lower in a serial sale, in
some of the fixed costs of the deals, such which the taxpayer pays a commission to
tinuing

and can exact better terms. This measure

as the advice of tax counsel and, in the case

of "trust" deals, the legal fees associated
with creating and maintaining the trust.
While the underwriting fees appear to
be a standard percentage of gross proceeds, it is unlikely that underwriting has

constant marginal costs. Instead, one
would expect that underwriting has both
fixed and variable costs, which would
lead to a minimum deal size for which the

a broker just as a retail investor would.
Announcement Effects and Declines in

Price of Underlying Stock
Another cost of hedging with exchangeable securities is that, by definition, the

transaction cannot be done in secret. In

order to attract buyers, the taxpayer has
to announce the transaction before it happens.18 The announcement may raise concerns in the market about asymmetric in-

standard percentage contract is profitable.
Of the 61 transactions in our sample, only
two have gross proceeds of $50 million or formation and corporate governance. For

less, three transactions have gross proceeds between $50 million and $75 mil-

instance, the underlying stock price will
decline if the market suspects the taxpayer

lion, and four have gross proceeds be- is selling based on private (negative) in-

tween $75 million and $100 million. We

formation, or if the market believes the

do not have data on underwriting fees for taxpayer has been serving a useful monithree of the smallest four transactions; for toring rule that now will end. Because
the transaction with gross proceeds of $50
million, however, the underwriting fee is
3.5 percent of gross proceeds. The transactions between $75 million and $100 mil-

these price declines occur before the taxpayer has implemented the hedge, the
taxpayer's profit on the hedged asset is

eroded.

lion have the standard 3 percent underIn contrast, other alternatives generally
writing cost. We interpret these data as can be implemented more discretely, so

consistent with a minimum transaction

the market generally does not know of the
disposition until after it has occurred. Obviously, if the sale must be registered (e.g.,

size.

In contrast, Mikkelson and Partch

(1985) report substantially higher under- a secondary offering), it is no more diswriting fees for secondary offerings. Forcrete than an exchangeable offering, but
registered offerings, they report a mean registration generally is unnecessary for
underwriting fee of 6.7 percent of grossfirms that have held their stock for at least
proceeds; for non-registered offerings, one year.19 Even if this holding period has
18 While the point is obvious with an offering to the public markets, the same is true of a private placement
because potential buyers - generally, sophisticated institutions - learn of the taxpayer's interest in cashing
out. A difference, though, is that in a private placement the taxpayer can offer less detailed disclosure, and is
less likely to be sued under the securities laws. These two costs - preparing disclosure and incurring potential liability - are additional frictions burdening exchangeable securities. The magnitude of these costs is not
measured here.

19 The origin of this requirement is Section 5 of the Securities Act, which requires the "issuer" and the "underwriter" to supply a prospectus upon selling stock. While this requirement obviously does not apply to an
investor that has purchased stock in the public markets, it could apply to an investor that has received stock
in a private placement and immediately resells it, since the investor might be viewed as an "underwriter."
One way to avoid this problem is to sell such securities in another private placement (i.e., to another qualified

buyer under Rule 144A), but the sale price may have to be discounted, since resale of such securities is
restricted. Alternatively, the investor can sell the securities in the public markets under Rule 144, but, for the
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nitude of
these announcement effects, direct
we
satisfied,
officers,

use the event
study methodology.
We reshareholders
are
obligated

transactionsgress
in
the
the total
daily returnfirm's
on the underlying stock on the return for the valuehas been executed.20 Thus, disclosure
weighted market index and a set of

sto

disclosure can come after the transaction

about a block sale or an over-the-counter

dummy variables. We include dummy

hedge is late enough to have no effect onvariables for each day in two 11-day event
the taxpayer's return. With a serial sale, windows, one centered on the announcedisclosures about early sales sometimes ment date, and the other centered on the
may have to be made before later sales pricing date.
have taken place; the information effects We define the announcement date as
of such disclosures could reduce the value
the earliest of either (1) a news account of
of the remaining position. While this is a plans to issue the exchangeable securities
disadvantage of serial sales, the effect security or (2) the pricing date, which is
should be muted by the fact that disclo- the date on which the securities are priced
sure of one sale does not necessarily tell (typically the day before they are issued).
the market that another sale is coming. For 19 of the 61 transactions, the anDisclosure aside, each of these alternatives nouncement date is within two trading
involves an investment bank, whether as days of the pricing date, which implies

broker or as hedging counterparty, and that it may be difficult to separate the eftheoretically the bank could use its ad- fects associated with the announcement
vance knowledge of the hedge to bet of a security and the execution of the seagainst the stock, thereby driving down curity issuance. By including both event
the price. Yet the investment bank has a windows in the same regression, the estireputational incentive to be discrete and, mates reflect the effects of the announcein some cases, the risk of insider trading ment holding the effects of execution conor other securities law liability is a further stant (and vice versa). As an alternative

deterrent.21

methodology for estimating the an-

Thus, there is likely to be greater mar- nouncement effects, we focus on the 42
ket scrutiny of an exchangeable offering securities for which the announcement
than of alternatives. To estimate the mag- precedes the execution by more than two

rule to be available, the stock must be held for a year before the sale (and, in some cases, the investor can apply

its predecessor's holding period toward this requirement). In addition, the investor must satisfy certain
volume and manner of sale limitations, and must file Form 144 no later than the date of the sale. In some
cases, advisors believe that investors can hedge on the over-the-counter market even before they can sell (i.e.,
before the Rule 144 holding period requirement has been satisfied). For a discussion, see Schizer (2001).
20 An "affiliate," including an officer, director, or certain shareholders that own more than 10 percent of a firm,

must comply with Rule 144 in selling securities in the public markets (i.e., even if they did not acquire the
stock in a private placement). Thus, they must file Form 144 no later than the date of the sale, and they also
must comply with volume and manner of sale requirements (but not with the Rule 144 holding period, unless
the stock was acquired in a private placement).
Other disclosure requirements can apply to investors with smaller positions that are not officers or directors. A taxpayer that owns 5 percent of a publicly traded firm is required, under SEC Rule 13D, to report any
sales within 90 days after the transaction. Likewise, a taxpayer with a smaller position that is making periodic
disclosure (e.g., in a form 10-k) may have to disclose the transaction if it is material, but, again, this disclosure
comes after the disposition has been completed.
21 Where the bank is the hedging counterparty, moreover, the investment bank will not want news of the disposition to disseminate until after the bank has hedged its own exposure on the derivative it has sold to the
client (and, in the usual case, the investment bank hedges by shorting the stock). This incentive is diminished
in cases where the investment bank passes this risk on to the client (i.e., by tying the price on the taxpayer's
derivative to the price attained by the investment bank on its short sales).
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days

securities have an average excess return
estimate
the
of -0.51 percent, but this estimated effect

and

announcement effect window.

The market model allows each

m

is only statistically different from zero (us-

ing a two-tailed
test) at the 74 percent
underlying's stock to have a different
senconfidence
sitivity (i.e., market beta) to returns
on the level. Considering longer
event
periods suggests a larger negative
market portfolio. To estimate the
model,
but without much statistical preciwe include available daily stockeffect
returns
sion. For
example, over the five-day winover the period starting 500 trading
days
dow centered on the announcement date,
before the filing date for the exchangeable
the cumulative average abnormal return
security and ending with the maturity
is -1.92
percent but the p-value for the Fdate of the exchangeable security
or the
test ofafter
whether this set of coefficients difend of 2001 if the security matures
December 2001.
fers from zero is 0.32; for the announcement day and the following two days, the
Panel A of Table 4 provides the average
cumulative average abnormal return is
abnormal returns for the sample of under-1.62 percent with a p-value of 0.14.
lying securities. The first column provides

estimates of the 11-trading-day window Panel B of Table 4 reports the median
abnormal return on each of the days in
the event-window and the percent of
the announcement date, the underlying

centered on the announcement date. On

TABLE 4

RETURNS FOR UNDERLYING STOCKS AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT AND FILING DAYS

Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns from Market Model

Announcement Day Filing Day
Event -5 days -0.049 (-0.15) -0.060 (-0.13)
Event -4 days 0.44 (1.38) 0.13 (0.23)
Event -3 days 0.096 (0.26) 0.40 (0.83)
Event -2 days -0.085 (-0.20) 0.70 (1.46)
Event -1 day -0.21 (-0.54) -0.95 (-2.62)
Event day -0.51 (-1.13) -2.38 (-4.20)
Event + 1 day -0.44 (-1.17) 0.58 (1.33)
Event + 2 days -0.67 (-1.45) 0.30 (0.73)
Event + 3 days -0.11 (-0.26) 0.024 (0.06)
Event + 4 days 0.60 (1-51) 0.55 (1-37)
Event + 5 days 0.38 (0.91) -0.14 (-0.49)
Panel B: Median Abnormal Returns and Percent Positive

Announcement Day Filing Day
Percent

Percent

Abnormal Return Positive Abnormal Return Positive

Event -5 days -0.23 43.3 -0.58 46.7
Event -4 days 0.031 51.7 -0.041 50.0
Event -3 days 0.073 53.3 -0.010 50.0
Event -2 days -0.38 43.3 0.33 55.0
Event -1 day -0.16 48.3 -1.29 30.0
Event day -0.55 45.0 -2.15 20.0
Event + 1 day -0.50 36.7 0.27 53.3
Event + 2 days -0.75 40.0 0.29 62.3
Event + 3 days -0.42 43.3 -0.065 47.5
Event + 4 days 0.18 56.7 0.18 54.1
Event + 5 days 0.36 60.0 0.061 45.9

Excess returns are listed as percentages; t-statist
returns are calculated using a market model. For
confidence

interval

around
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deals may convey
about how
transactionstrust
with
a news
positive
a
an individual
insiderConsistent
feels about the prosturn on each
day.
pects of the underlying
firm. In contrast,
erage abnormal
returns
from
sion, the median
r
many of the publicabnormal
issuers have no direct

link to the underlying
firm. Consistent
percent positive
suggest
t
nouncementwith
of
this hypothesis,
the the
issuance
negative ano
nouncement
day effects
are concentrated
able securities
has
a negative
e
the sample of trust-based deals.22 stock
For
value of the in
underlying
example, for the two-dayof
window starttistical significance
this r
ing one day before the announcement day,
ginal at best.
the abnormal return
on transactions
with
As another way
to
examine
w
corporate issuers is 0.26 percent
but trans
the
results are tainted
by
abnormal return for trust transactions is
which the announcement
da
-2.45 percent and this difference
is statistially ill-defined,
we
estim
nouncement window for the 42 transactically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.23

tions in which the announcement date

precedes the pricing date by more thanThese announcement effects are
smaller than those found in secondary
two trading days. The estimated effects
offerings. Mikkelson and Partch (1985)
(not reported in a table) are larger in magestimate a -2.87 percent two-day abnornitude but of marginal statistical signifimal return for the announcement of a regcance. The announcement day abnormal
istered secondary offerings using data
return is -0.31 percent (t-statistic = -0.68)
from 1972-1981;24 for non-registered ofbut the day after the announcement has
ferings the timing of the announcement
an abnormal return of -0.85 percent (t-staeffect is slightly later (i.e., it occurs mainly
tistic = -2.12). The five-day event window
has an estimated abnormal return of -2.47
on the day after what they define as the
percent (p-value for the F-test = 0.14) and announcement day) and the abnormal
return is only -1.96 percent. Consistent
the three-day window starting with the
announcement date has an estimated abwith this result, Hudson, Jensen, and
normal return of -1.82 percent (p-value =Pugh (1993) find a -2.65 percent two-day
0.061).
announcement effect for completed secSince there are variations within our
ondary offerings using data from 1974sample, one could imagine that the an-1989. One reason that secondary offerings
nouncement effects on the underlyingmay have a more negative announcement
effect than the exchangeable securities is
stocks depend on the type of security, al-

though, given the small size of ourthat the issuers in our sample retain some

sample, we approach sample splits withupside potential, although the fact that
caution. Most importantly, we testthis exposure is retained in part for tax
purposes should render it less reassuring
whether trust deals generate larger anto the market.
nouncement effects. The theory is that
22 An alternative possibility is that the timing of the effects is different. The negative effects on the underlying
stock in the trust-based deals, relative to the corporate issuers, are concentrated on the day before and the day
of the announcement. In contrast, for the two days following the announcement day, the underlying stocks in

deals with corporate issuers fall by 1.53 percent but those associated with trust-based deals fall by only 0.34
percent; this difference, however, is imprecisely measured.
23 To test another variation in our sample, we compare PHONES and DECS. We find that the estimates are too
noisy to detect any difference.
24 Consistent with the possibility that the negative effect depends on the closeness of the selling shareholder to

the governance of the underlying firm, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) find that the negative effect is larger
when the registration is on behalf of a corporate manager or director.
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Since the exchangeabletwo-day
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price,
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of
-1.11
percent.
Based
offering may functionVarma,
like a sale of a large
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Ghosh,
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block of stock. Typically, the entire
offersider
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unlikely
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ing is issued of
on the same
day.28 Thus, futu
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anticipation
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stock.
Inste

writer may discount
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price,
the
dilution
of
owners
reducing
the taxpayer's proceeds (and
effect
on
monitoring

value.25

thus the profit from the appreciated asset).

Notably, this cost also arisesthe
in a block
despite
sion of the estimated announcement efsale. In contrast, a serial sale is less likely
fects in our sample, the magnitude ofto trigger this effect. By selling in drips
these effects seems reasonable compared and drabs, the taxpayer hopes to avoid
Overall,

to studies of similar transactions. We con-

st

flooding the market.29 An over-the-

counter derivative can also be constructed

clude that announcement effects are one

cost of hedging with public securities. to avoid this liquidity effect. The hedge
Since secondary offerings yield larger ef- can take effect over a few days - with a
fects, exchangeable securities are less portion of the position hedged each day costly in this regard than one-time sales so the investment bank's short sales are
of stock. Moreover, this cost should be not concentrated enough to cause price
more important for issuers that are per- pressure.
ceived to have inside information.
Thus, price pressure is more important
for exchangeable securities than for key
alternatives. To estimate the magnitude of
Execution of the Transaction and Price
this friction, we examine the price of the
Pressure
underlying stock around the issue date;
the estimated average abnormal returns
The underlying stock price can be affrom the 11-day window around the isfected not only by the announcement, but
also by the execution, of exchangeable of-sue date are in the second column of Panel
A of Table 4. Again, we estimate the efferings. In an execution effect, the price
fects of the announcement date and the
decline is not driven by information (e.g.,
25 A potential difference in the signaling effects associated with those transactions is that the issuer continued to
bear risk of loss in the underlying stock, unlike the mandatory exchangeables in our sample.
26 There is one exception: Execution of the offering can convey information when the market is uncertain whether

the announced transaction will be completed.
27 These effects are discussed in the literature on the price elasticity of stocks (or, "does the demand curve for
stock slope down?"). See, among others, Hodrick (1999), Holthausen et al. (1990), and Shleifer (1986).
28 In fact, it is difficult to issue a security to public markets over the course of several days. For one thing, the
disclosure must be updated for each mini-offering (although, to an extent, this problem can be ameliorated
with a so-called shelf registration). Also, in order for the various mini-offerings to be fungible, they have to
have the same economic terms. Yet this goal is hard to achieve if the securities are issued on different days,
assuming (as is customary) that the exchangeable security's issue price is the same as the underlying stock
price when issued.
29 If the sale must comply with Rule 144 (e.g., because the seller is an affiliate or because the stock was originally
received in a private placement), the seller must comply with volume and manner of sale limitations. Given
the limits on how the selling broker can "shop" a customer's offer in these circumstances, the seller may not
get the best execution.
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The issuer's
participation
in the rein
the
same

date

mode

confound
bound depends information
on features of the hedg-

announcement with execution effects. On

the day before the filing date, the abnor-

mal return for underlying stock is -0.95
percent, and is statistically significant at
the 95 percent confidence level. On the filing date, the abnormal return is -2.38 percent and statistically different from zero
at the 99 percent confidence level. For the
two day period, the abnormal return is
-3.33 percent, suggesting that the underlying stock faces price pressure when the
exchangeable security is issued.30 Panel B
of Table 4 examines the median abnormal

ing security. After issuing a DECS, for example, the issuer still holds the stock but

also is, effectively, short an out-of-themoney call option on the stock and long
an at-the-money put option on the stock.
While the issuer nominally retains all appreciation just above the initial stock price
(i.e., up until the exercise price on the call
option), the issuer, in fact, does not keep
this entire value: Unfortunately for the
issuer, this appreciation reduces the value
of the put option purchased by the issuer
and, correspondingly, increases the value

returns and the percent of abnormal re- of the call option sold by the issuer, thereby

turns that are positive. These data are con- increasing the issuer's liability on the
sistent with our inferences about average DECS.31
abnormal returns.

Finally, a caveat is in order. While the

Price pressure sometimes is a transitory underlying stock price clearly declines
phenomenon caused by placing a largewhen the exchangeable security is issued,

order over a short period of time. If theand we believe at least some of this decline
price pressure is a transitory effect, then is attributable to price pressure that arises
the price of the underlying stock shouldfrom market microstructure, as discussed
rebound shortly after the negative effect here, it is possible that some (or, conceivof the transaction. While the abnormal
ably, all) of this price decline is attributable to a different friction. The most likely
return on the underlying stock for the first

candidate, in our view, is the need to offive days after the filing day is a combined
1.31 percent, this estimated effect is onlyfer public investors generous pricing. We
now turn to that cost.
statistically different from zero at the 80

percent confidence level. In any event, a
rebound does not wholly compensate the
Generous Pricing for Public Investors
issuer for the price pressure because the
on Hedging Security
decline occurs before the issuer hedges,
while the rebound occurs after the hedge In theory, it is difficult to say whether
issuers have to offer generous pricing to
is in place.
30 These abnormal returns do not vary systematically across trust-based and corporate issuer transactions or
across PHONES and DECS. In addition, we obtain similar results if we exclude observations for which the
announcement date is within two days of the pricing date.
31 For example, when the stock price is $100, a 5-year call option with a strike price of $120 has a Black-Scholes
value of $26.120, assuming volatility of 0.27, an interest rate of 5 percent and no dividends. When the stock

price rises by a dollar, the Black-Scholes option value increases to $26.780. By selling such a call through a
DECS, then, the issuer loses $0.66 on the DECS as the stock price rises from $100 to $101. To be precise,
though, the issuer sells only a fraction of a call: Since the holder typically gets only 83 percent of the appreciation above $120, the issuer only loses $0.55 (83 percent of $0.66) by being short the call option. As noted, the
issuer also loses on the at-the-money put option embedded in the DECS. Worth $11.976 when the stock price

is $100, the put value declines by $0.238 to $11.738 when the stock price is $101. Overall, then, the issuer gains
one dollar from the price increase by owning the stock but losses $0.788 from the options embedded in the
DECS, for an overall gain of $0.212. Thus, the issuer participates fully in the underlying stock returns before

issuance (the decline) but participates only partially in these returns after issuance (the rebound). On the
assumed facts, the issuer participates in roughly 20 percent of subsequent appreciation.
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Why Generous Pricing May be Necessary

counted pricing should have at least three
effects, and a fourth is also possible. First,

While exchangeable securities are closevolume in the underlying stock should
substitutes for the stock, they are not per-increase when the exchangeable security
fect substitutes. Although typically issuedis issued. Once this security becomes
at the same price as the underlying stock, available, some investors who already
their economic terms are not the same.
own the stock will sell it, replacing it with
exchangeable securities. This clientele will
DECS, for instance, offer a larger periodic
payment in return for less opportunity for
be relatively indifferent to the latter
gain.32 The key point is not that the secusecurity's complexity and illiquidity be-

rities are different per se, but that these
cause these investors (e.g., university endifferences may be unfamiliar. Hence,
dowments) are sophisticated and plan to
public investors may demand discounted
hold the security for the long term. Secpricing before accepting such complexond, the short interest in the underlying
ity.33 In addition, the exchangeable secustock should rise when the exchangeable
rity is less liquid than the underlying stock
security is issued. Once this security bebecause it has a smaller float. If investors
comes available, arbitrageurs, who may
value liquidity, they will prefer the stocknot already own the underlying stock, are
unless the exchangeable security offerslikely to sell it short and buy the exchangegenerous terms.34
able security as a way to capitalize on the
If generous pricing is needed, it repre-generous pricing. Third, the price of the
sents a friction that is unique to exchange-underlying stock should decline when the
able securities. Obviously, such a discountexchangeable security is issued. The sales
is not needed if the issuer merely sells thedescribed above - and, more generally,
stock, whether in a serial sale or in a blockthe fact that a more generous alternative
sale. A discount also should not be neceshas become available - could suggest desary in an over-the-counter derivativeclining demand for the underlying stock.
transaction, since a securities dealer will Finally, the price of the exchangeable senot be daunted by complexity or illiquidcurity may rise relative to the price of the
ity, given the dealer's expertise and itsunderlying stock, although this will not
ability to hedge the derivative throughnecessarily occur. The key question is
short sales in the public markets. (The aswhich investor benefits from the generous
sumption here is that dealers are subject
pricing - or, to be more precise, how long
to enough competitive pressure so they
it will take for this generous pricing to be
32 In a case study, Petersen (2001) values a DECS issued by Solomon Brothers based on Cincinnati Bell stock. In
that case, the critical issue is whether dividends will remain at their historical level, or will be increased to
preserve the historic yield.
33 Cf. Kang and Lee (1996) (finding that convertible bonds have an excess return, relative to an index of convertible bonds, of 1.11 percent; and arguing that this underpricing of convertibles on the first day of reported
trading is a discount, which is needed because of uncertainty about the convertible's true value).
34 For a general discussion of how illiquidity can affect stock returns and raise the required rate of return on a
security, see Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996).
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but
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as is usually the case. also
Thus,
mand.36 Hedge
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"CBA [convertible bond
arbitrage] manferences between
exchangeab
agers are generally long volatility/'37
This
and the underlying
stock
sin
35 See Schizer (2000c). Foreign investors might also favor these securities as an alternative to equity, which is
subject to a withholding tax on dividends. Yet there is some risk that these exchangeable securities might also
be subject to withholding tax, at least in some circumstances. In any event, anecdotal evidence suggests that
these securities are sold primarily to U.S. investors.
36 For instance, Morgan Stanley has issued a number of such deals off its "shelf" registration statement.
37 There is another way to extract volatility-related returns for convertible bonds that are principal-protected,
but the strategy is harder to implement for exchangeable securities, which do not offer meaningful principal
protection. The key lies in the "delta" of the security - that is, the amount the security's price changes when
the stock price changes by one dollar (see Burnaby- Atkins, 2002).
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For principal-protected bonds, when the stock price is very low, so that a principal-protected bond is unlikely to be converted, changes in the stock price will cause only modest changes in the bond's value. On the
other hand, when the stock price is very high, so that the bond is nearly certain to be converted, a dollar
change in the stock price will cause essentially a dollar change in the bond's value. Thus, the delta of these

bonds increases as the stock price increases. As a result, when a hedge fund dynamically hedges a principalprotected bond, it will make money from imperfections in the hedge both when the stock price rises, and
when it falls. Consider, for example, a bond that is convertible into one share and offers principal protection
of $100 (so the embedded call option has an exercise price of $100). Assuming the bond's delta is .5 when the
stock price is $100, the fund will hedge at this stock price by shorting one half of a share for each bond. If the
stock price rises to $105, the short sale will decline by $2.50, but the convertible bond will increase by more than

$2.50 (because, by the time the stock price rises to $104, the bond's delta is greater than .5). Correspondingly, if

the stock price falls to $95, the short sale will appreciate by $2.50 but the bond will appreciate by less than
$2.50 (because, by the time the stock price falls to $96, the bond's delta is less than .5).
The key to this strategy is that delta increases with the stock price. Yet while this condition holds for princi-

pal-protected securities, it does not hold for the exchangeable securities in our study, which do not offer
meaningful principal protection. On these securities, delta is high when the stock price is either very low or
very high, but is lower when the stock price is between 100 percent and 120 percent of the security's issue
price (because the issuer retains opportunity for gain in this trading range). The strategy "works" - in the
sense that it yields profits regardless of the market's direction - only in trading ranges in which delta is increasing.
38 There is a developing market in LEAPS, which have longer terms, but this market was relatively thin during
the period for which we have data (see Schizer, 2001).
39 This rebate is a crucial element of this trading strategy, and it would not be offered to less favored customers,
such as most individual investors.
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change.
deal-specific dummy variables allow each
Some of the profit in the coupon-stripunderlying stock to have its own average
ping strategy may arise from overly gen-

erous pricing on the exchangeable

volume. The dummy variables for the

windows around announcement and fil-

security's coupon. Yet some also arises
from the cheap financing the fund is able
to secure. By shorting the stock, the hedge

ing capture abnormal daily volume

view.

days after the filing date. As noted above,
though, an increase in volume is ambigu-

around the important dates for the hedgfund in effect is able to borrow short sale
ing security.
Table 5 reports the results. Specifically,
proceeds for 1 percent per year. The
trick - since the fund does not want to
the second column reports the abnormal
take market risk on this short sale - is to
trading volume around the filing date.40
find an offsetting position that yields more On the filing date, volume in the underthan 1 percent per year. Obviously, an ex- lying stock is almost double the normal
changeable security fits this bill, causing volume and, on the day after the filing
hedge funds to demand these securities. date, volume is 140 percent greater than
Coupon stripping is an especially attrac- normal. This abnormally high volume
tive strategy with exchangeable securities starts just before the filing date, persists
because they do not offer principal pro- on the first day after the filing date, and
decays thereafter. The two days precedtection, and thus make relatively high
ing the filing date have excess volume of
periodic payments.
To sum up, there are reasons why gen- 38 percent and 36 percent, respectively.
erous pricing may not be needed for ex- Volume is more than 60 percent above
changeable securities, and evidence of a normal on the second and third days afrise in the underlying stock's volume and ter the filing date, and is 45 percent above
short interest could be consistent with this
normal on the fourth and fifth trading

Empirical Evidence

ous evidence, which is consistent with

To test for abnormal trading volume, we both generous pricing-related and
regress the logarithm of the daily trading nongenerous pricing-related trading.

As a more specific test for convertible
volume on the logarithm of shares outstanding for the underlying stock (taken arbitrage activity, we examine the short
from the CRSP data base), a set of trans- interest on the underlying stock, both
action-specific constants, a set of transac- when the exchangeable security is issued
40 The first column, which is less relevant to our hypothesis, shows trading volume both before and after the

announcement day. This volume is roughly 25 percent below the average trading volume for the security.
These daily differences are often statistically different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. These
results suggest that trading volume in the underlying is slightly depressed (relative to earlier and later trading volume) around the announcement date. While the days surrounding the announcement have unusually
low trading volume, the trading volume on the announcement day is very close to normal.
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TABLE 5

EXCESS VOLUME IN THE UNDERLYING STOCKS AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT AND FILING DAYS

Announcement Day Filing Day

Event -5 days -0.075 (-0.77) 0.097 (0.87)
Event -4 days -0.081 (-0.89) 0.20 (1-84)
Event - 3 days -0.15 (-1-52) 0.16 (1-94)
Event -2 days -0.28 (-3.08) 0.38 (3.59)
Event - 1 day -0.25 (-2.98) 0.36 (3-91)
Event day 0.096 (-0.81) 0.95 (8.13)
Event + 1 day -0.40 (-4.09) 1.41 (9.83)
Event + 2 days -0.24 (-2.32) 0.74 (6.80)
Event + 3 days -0.25 (-2.84) 0.62 (5.93)
Event + 4 days -0.18 (-1.86) 0.44 (4.35)
Event + 5 days -0.16 (-1.40) 0.46 (4.50)

Excess volume is listed as a fraction; t-statistics are in parenth
underlying stock is publicly traded. Excess volume is calculated
standing for the underlying stock, a transaction-specific constant
volume, transaction-specific sensitivities to market volume, and

two event windows.

and when it matures.41 Short interest data

after the exchangeable security is issued,

are reported on the 15th of each month from which is consistent with convertible

brokers. To measure changes in short in- arbitrageurs shorting the stock (though
terest, we compare the observation imme- ambiguous as to mispricing).

diately after the issuance with the
observation immediately before the issuance and, to allow more time for hedge
funds to act (and to avoid increases in anticipation of issuance), we compare short

interest two observations after the issuance

date with short interest two observations

An alternative explanation for in-

creased short interest around the issue

date is that news of the exchangeable security increases the pessimism of other
investors, inducing them to short the underlying stock. To eliminate this informa-

tion-based explanation, we examine the
before the issuance date. As a simple mea-short interest around the maturity date.
sure of short interest, we measure whetherSince maturity is easy to predict and ocshort interest increases or decreases becurs well after the issue date, it is unlikely
tween the two comparison observations.
that maturity prompts any informationWe can obtain short interest data
driven short sales. In contrast, maturity
around the issuance of 45 transactions.
of the security will induce convertible
Using the observations immediately bearbitrageurs to unwind their short posifore and after the issue date, we find that
tions. In other words, even if a surge in
36 underlying stocks experience an inshort interest upon issuance is not definicrease in short interest activity and nine
tive evidence of convertible arbitrage, a
experience a decrease. We can reject the
reduction in short interest at maturity is
hypothesis of random increases and devery strong evidence of this activity.
creases (i.e., the null hypothesis of a 0.50
The change in short interest at maturity
probability of an increase) at the 99 peris even more striking than at the issue
date. Of the 25 transactions for which we

cent confidence level. When we use the

longer horizon, we find that the short inhave short interest data at maturity, over

terest increases in 39 of the 45 transactions.

This change provides compelling evi-

dence that more investors short the stock

the one month horizon 23 underlying

stocks have a decrease in short interest.

Using the two observation window, the

41 For more on short interest and arbitrage activity, see Brent et al. (1990).
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percent, respectively.
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on the exchangeable secunull
hypothesis
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the level of short sales are random.
rities over the three intervals - 0.55, 0.24,
reject

the

To test more directly for short-term gen-

erous pricing, we compare the initial returns on the exchangeable securities and
underlying stock over the same period.

and 0.26 percent - are not statistically dif-

ferent from zero at conventional confi-

dence levels. Thus, the evidence does not

suggest that short-term holders benefit
Our methodology follows studies that from mispricing.
It is still possible that long-term holdlook at underpricing of initial public offerings of stock. A key difference is that ers benefit from underpricing, but it is not
our benchmark is not the overall market, feasible to test for this effect directly. Over

but the underlying security (which, for time, it is more difficult to compare returns
almost all of the exchangeable securities, of the exchangeable security and underhas the same initial value as the issue price lying stock because cash flows differ and
of the exchangeable security).42 While the non-linearities in the exchangeable
exchangeable security and underlying security's payoff become more imporstock offer somewhat different payoffs, tant.43 Yet the fact that the underlying
stock price declines when the exchangethey should trade in tandem when the
underlying stock price fluctuates mod- able is issued, as noted above, is consisestly near the initial offering date. Over tent with the idea that certain clienteles,
time, however, larger discrepancies who are relatively tolerant of complexity
should arise due to different features of
and illiquidity, are selling their stock in
the two securities (e.g., the difference be- order to buy the exchangeable security. In
tween the coupon and the dividend, the other words, this substitution effect - and
retention of upside potential by the issuer,
the impending maturity date, etc.).

For a sample of 42 transactions, we
identify trading data within two days of
the filing date. We calculate the return on
the exchangeable security as the difference

not the market microstructure explanation

offered above - may be responsible for
some (or all) of this price decline.
Other Constraints

between the offering price and the last

Three other frictions, which are not ex-

traded price at the end of the first day of

plored empirically here, can burden both
an offering of exchangeable securities and
an over-the-counter transaction, but not
a block or serial sale. In other words, these

trading, the second trading day, and the
third trading day. For these deals, the av-

erage returns on the exchangeable security over these three intervals (i.e., the
third interval is a three-day return) are
1.21, 1.51, and 1.78 percent, respectively.
These returns indicate a positive return to

the original owner of the exchangeable
security. However, the returns on the underlying stock are also positive over these

three intervals with average returns of

costs apply only to the tax-deferred alter-

natives, and burden these more or less

equally. First, in order to avoid a current
tax, the issuer must remain exposed to

(relatively modest) fluctuations in the
underlying stock, whether the issuer is
hedging with exchangeable securities or

over-the-counter derivatives.

42 Given the nature of the exchangeable security, one would expect it to have similar exposure to market risk as

the underlying stock. Thus, comparing the returns of the exchangeable security and the underlying stock
implicitly controls for market risk.

43 Put another way, assessing long-term mispricing requires estimates or various parameters that íniorm tne
value of derivatives embedded in the securities. Uncertainty over these parameters complicates assessing
long-term mispricing.
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For example, one prerequisite for hedge
s
the-counter derivative. Financial Acaccounting is a relatively close correlation
counting Standard 133 ("FAS 133"), which
between the hedge and hedged asset.45 For
became effective on July 1, 2000, requires
tax reasons, however, the taxpayer will not
want the correlation to be too close, or the
firms periodically to report on accounting statements the fair market valuehedge
of will trigger a taxable constructive
sale (see Schizer, 2001).
certain derivative positions.44 Depending

upon the rule's precise application, it
could introduce undesirable volatility in
The Advantage of Private Transactions

the earnings of firms that hedge an appreThus far, we have documented costs that
ciated stock position - volatility that does
not accurately reflect the firm's true arise
eco- in exchangeable securities offerings
nomic position. The concern is that but
thenot in private over-the-counter transfirm would have to report changes inactions.
the
Our findings help explain the
value of the hedge, but would not also
market's
be
preference for private transactions,
able to report offsetting changes in athe
preference that previously has been estabunderlying stock being hedged. As an
il- only through anecdotal evidence.46
lished
lustration of this accounting mismatch,
While the purpose of this paper is posiassume the hedged stock appreciatestive,
by rather than normative, our findings
50 percent. This gain is not reflected
in (modest) implications for reform. For
have

instance, as one of us has written elseearnings (because the stock is not being
marked to market, and has not been sold),
where, private transactions are vulnerable
but the corresponding loss on the derivato government responses that would not

tive would be reflected (because it is reach
be- public exchangeable offerings.47 If

44 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 133 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd., 1998).
45 See FAS 133.20(b) (requiring, as condition for qualifying as fair value hedge, that "the hedging relationship be
expected to be highly effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value").

46 Obviously, empirical research on private transactions would allow for a more definitive judgment (e.g., in
assessing costs that might arise in private deals but not in public ones), but data limitations are a significant
obstacle here. For a detailed anecdotal survey of costs associated with private deals, see Schizer (2001).
47 The main vulnerability of private transactions is that dealers ordinarily hedge the derivatives they have sold
to clients, typically by engaging in short sales in the public market. (In public exchangeable offerings, in
contrast, the counterparty is a public investor - not a dealer - and thus does not necessarily need to hedge.)
To implement the requisite short sales, dealers must borrow the underlying stock. In large transactions, dealers usually want to borrow the taxpayer's stock. Yet this step weakens the tax analysis, and the government
could easily use regulatory authority to prevent this borrowing of stock (see Schizer, 2001).
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TAXPAYER STOCK PRICE AND

include the daily abnormal returns for the

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF

underlying stock. We measure these ab-

EXCHANGEABLE OFFERINGS

normal returns as the residuals from a

market model for each underlying stock.
In this section, we explore whether the
taxpayer's stock price rises when an We
ex- allow the responsiveness of the
issuer's stock to the underlying stock to
changeable offering is announced.48 Such
differ after the issuance of the hedging
a market vote of confidence would imply

security.
that the tax savings or other benefits from

One would expect that the

issuer's stock would be less sensitive to
these transactions outweighed the costs.
the underlying stock after issuing the exA caveat is in order, though. The market

security. We also include a
is reacting not only to the decisionchangeable
to
separate dummy variable that captures
hedge and raise money, but also to posreturns after the issuance of the exchangesible uses of the proceeds. In our sample,
able security.
issuers typically say proceeds will be used
The first column of Table 6 presents the
for "general corporate purposes," so we
are unable to test whether announcement
average abnormal return for each of the
effects are related to the use of proceeds.49 11 days in the announcement period. On
The fact that proceeds are not typically the announcement day, the issuer has an
48 Obviously, trust-based transactions cannot be tested in this way because we cannot measure the market value
of the taxpayer who is hedging through the trust.
4y While the most commonly-stated use or proceeds ror corporate issuers is general corporate purposes, press
accounts sometimes link the securities issuance to new investment initiatives or the retirement of other debt.
In the case of Alliant Energy's PHONES transaction based on McLeodUSA, managers felt that the market did

not recognize the value of Alliant's investment; over the 13 month period before issuing the security,
McLeodUSA's stock appreciated by almost 400 percent but Alliant's stock price fell by 3 percent (see Sherer,
2000). Alliant's position in McLeodUSA was worth $2.6 billion and accounted for over half of Alliant's market capitalization. The PHONES transaction hedged roughly 15 percent of this position. Thus, in this example, the managers hoped the news would focus on the value they could realize from their portfolio investment in addition to the possible uses of funds. As an aside, while Alliant's managers faulted investors for not

appreciating the value of McLeodUSA, the subsequent stock performance suggests Alliant's investors may
have been clairvoyant. By the end of 2001, McLeodUSA's stock traded at a price below its value in December
of 1998.
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TABLE 6

Average Median

Abnormal Abnormal Percent
Return t-statistic Return Positive

Event -5 days -0.48 (-112) -0.23 40.5
Event -4 days 0.080 (0.19) -0.13 40.5
Event -3 days 0.47 (1.12) -0.25 45.9
Event -2 days 0.68 (1.60) -0.15 48.6
Event - 1 day -0.35 (-0.82) -0.36 40.5
Event day 0.88 (2.08) 0.47 62.2
Event + 1 day 0.27 (0.63) -0.37 40.5
Event + 2 days -0.23 (-0.54) -0.056 48.6
Event + 3 days 0.065 (0.15) -0.12 45.9
Event + 4 days -0.35 (-0.83) -0.33 29.7
Event + 5 days -0.13 (-0.31) -0.041 48.6
Residual on underlying 0.061 (8.85)
Residual on underlying after issuance dummy -0.020 (-2.39)
After issuance dummy -0.0008 (-1.23)

Excess returns are listed as percentages; t-statistics are in parentheses. The sam
returns are calculated using a market model. For the percent positive, given th

confidence interval around the null hypothesis of 50.0 percent positive is [33.8 perc

exchangeable
offering,
abnormal return of 0.88 percent,
which
is a natural question
how this
statistically different from iszero
at reaction
the 95compares to similar

financings.
most well-known anpercent confidence level. Thus,
the The
marnouncement
effect for financings is the
ket responds positively when
exchangenegative effect
a seasoned equity offerable offerings are announced.
Asofexa result that is
consistent with manpected, the issuer's stock ising,
positively
related to idiosyncratic movements
agers issuingin
shares
the
when the firm's equityissuance,
is overvalued.aThis
underlying stock. Before the
1 signaling story is
analogous
to our finding that an expercent abnormal return for
the underlychangeable
contains a negative
ing stock would be associated
with offering
a 0.061
signalthe
about issuer.
the underlying stock.
percent additional return for
announcement effects
on the issuer's
However, after hedging, this For
sensitivity
is
stock,
in contrast,
three other transactions
reduced by about one-third
(i.e.,
the coefficient on the interaction term with the
may provide a closer analogy: (1) classic
dummy variable for days after the secu- (principal protected) exchangeable debt;
rity is issued is -0.020) and this reduction (2) asset securitization; and (3) an asset
is statistically different from zero at the sale.51 For classic exchangeable debt,
Ghosh, Varma, and Woolridge (1990) find
95 percent confidence level.50
a trivial (0.04 percent) abnormal return for

Comparison with Announcement Effects

the announcement window and Barber

(1993) finds a similar result.
For asset securitizations (usually assoWhile Table 6 documents a modest posi- ciated with issuing a financial security
tive market response to the issuance of an backed by the returns to a loan or credit
of Similar Transactions

50 Three factors explain why the issuer's exposure to risk in the underlying remains positive after the security is
issued. First, some of the issuers are in the same industry as the underlying so the coefficient also captures

industry-specific influences. Second, the securities do not offer a perfect hedge. Third, some issuers only
hedge part of their position in the underlying.
51 The issuance of convertible debt shares some features with exchangeable securities but is more likely just
another form of issuing equity. Consistent with this story, studies of convertible debt find roughly a -2.0
percent abnormal return upon announcement (see the summary in Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999).
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Frictions

card

and

Tax-Motivated

Hedging

ing. We identify
two significant frictions
portfolio),
Thomas
(1999)

that burdenreturn
offerings of public exchangepercent excess
on th
able offerings,
but not private transac- thi
ment day. He
attributes
tions.
One disadvantage, as improv
to which our
value to the
issuer's
empirical
evidence is ambiguous, is that
put assets to
productive
use;
investors may demand a discount
for
many large the
financial
institu
the relative
complexity and illiquidity of at
comparative
advantage
these
securities. Thisjust
study showsholdin
that
loans rather
than
contrast, Lockwood, Rutherford, and
there is no short-term mispricing, but
Herrera (1996) use earlier data and find
leaves open the possibility of long-term
no statistical evidence of abnormal returns
mispricing.
In addition, another key disadvantage
for securitizations, except for a positive
announcement effect of 2.79 percent for of exchangeable securities is the market
specialized finance companies (as op- attention they attract. By announcing a
posed to banks or automobile companies). hedge in advance and then implementing
Finally, Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995), it all at once, as typically occurs in examong others, examine the announce- changeable securities offerings, taxpayers
ment effects of asset sales and find a mean

can expect to lose approximately 5 percent

abnormal return of 1.41 percent; Allen and

of their appreciated stock's value. When
added to a 3 percent underwriting fee,
this cost may well exceed the economic

McConnell (1998) find a positive threeday announcement effect of 1.90 percent
for a sample of equity carve-outs. Both of
these studies find that the positive effects
are larger for firms that pay out the pro-

ceeds of these transactions either to share-

holders or creditors. In contrast, they reject the idea that these sales create value

benefit of the tax deferral. Since this extra

4 percent can be avoided with over-thecounter transactions, these private deals
offer a significant advantage. Thus, this
study sheds light on reasons why private

ter investment opportunities within the

transactions often are preferred.
Finally, the study reveals a modest but
statistically significant increase in a pub-

firm. We cannot conduct an analogous test

licly-traded taxpayer's stock price when

by enabling firms to reallocate cash to bet-

one of these transactions is announced.

because, as noted, we lack information
about use of proceeds for a significant
portion of our sample.
In summary, the positive announce-

or other benefits from these transactions

ment effect here is larger than the effect

outweigh the issuer's costs.

found for classic exchangeable debt or
asset securitizations, but smaller than the
effect found for asset sales and equity
carve-outs. While the precise source of
this positive reaction is unknowable, it
may be that shareholders value the fact
that exposure to an over-valued stock has
been reduced without triggering a capital gains tax.

This finding suggests that, in general, the

market believes the issuer's tax savings

In light of these three findings, it seems

likely that private transactions are a
greater threat to the tax base than public

exchangeable offerings. Yet the public

deals would remain a viable alternative

for at least some taxpayers if a legal reform rendered private transactions more

difficult.
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